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INTRODUCTION
During World War II, work began at the University of
Pennsylvania's Moore School of Engineering on the Electronic
Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC)-a machine
commissioned by the U.S. military and designed to calculate
munitions trajectories.1 Once completed, the ENIAC weighed thirty
tons and was seen by many as the world's first general purpose
electronic digital computer.2 While advancements in computing
power prompted the evolution of the ENIAC into the computers of
today, it is the software that runs on modern computers that make
them so crucial to our everyday lives. "Software" consists of the
programs that run on a computer and enable it to perform certain
functions.' However, as far as the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) is concerned, both software and business
methods fall under the umbrella of "computer-implemented
inventions."4 Patent applications to software and business methods
are grouped together because both are often claimed as abstract
processes implemented on computer hardware, and as such, they
both frequently fall victim to the abstract idea exception-one of the
three judicially created exceptions to patent eligibility.'
1. See generally Steven Levy, The Brief Histoiy of the ENIAC Computer, SMITHSONIAN
MAG. (Nov. 2013), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-brief-history-of-the-
eniac-computer-3889120 (tracing the development of the first computer, which
began as an idea of "a powerful new kind of electronic calculator [that] could
produce benefits to the war effort").
2. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 194 n.1 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC)-"the first
general purpose electronic digital computer"-to highlight the relative youth of the
computer industry); see also Elec. Numerical Integrator & Computer, U.S. Patent No.
3,120,606 (filed June 26, 1947). But see Honeywell Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., No. 4-
67 Civ. 138, 1973 WL 903, at *37-38, *89 (D. Minn. Oct. 19, 1973) (invalidating the
ENIAC patent and crediting John Vincent Atanasoff with inventorship of the first
electronic digital computer).
3. Cf CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAw OF PATENTS 204 (2d ed. 2011) (concluding
that despite "no universally accepted definition," it is most appropriate to describe
software as the "series of instructions, known as source code and object code, 'that
directs a computer to perform specified functions or operations"' (quoting Fantasy
Sports Props., Inc. v. Sportsline.com, Inc., 287 F.3d 1108, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2002))).
4. See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg.
7478, 7487 n.2 (Feb. 28, 1996) (describing computer-related inventions as all
"inventions implemented in a computer and inventions employing computer-
readable media").
5. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (noting that
the U.S. Supreme Court has long held that the statute governing patent-eligible
subject matter contains an implicit patentability exception for laws of nature, natural
1090 [Vol. 64:1089
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Patent eligibility is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 101, and the Supreme
Court has recognized that in drafting § 101 Congress intended to
provide patent protection to "anything under the sun that is made by
man."6 Section 101 has been the subject of heated discussion in
recent years as the courts have repeatedly attempted to define its
boundaries.7 Since 2011, the Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit have been engaged in one specific
back-and-forth over Ultramercial's patented method for providing
free media content to an Internet user in exchange for viewing a
third-party advertisement, which highlights the recent developments
in this field of law.8 This journey begins with the Supreme Court's
decision in Bilski v. Kappo and the Federal Circuit's subsequent
decision in Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC ° (" Ultramercial I'), in which
the court upheld Ultramercial's patented method." Since
Ultramercial I, the Federal Circuit has weighed in on Ultramercial's
patent twice more. The court once again upheld the patent in its
second review of Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC 2 ("Ultramercial IT'),
which was reconsidered in light of the Supreme Court's 2012
phenomena, and abstract ideas); infra notes 18-23 and accompanying text
(discussing patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and its three
judicially created exceptions).
6. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182 (quoting S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No.
82-1923, at 6 (1952)); see infra note 18 and accompanying text (providing the
statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 101).
7. See e.g., Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2107, 2119 (2013) (holding that naturally occurring gene sequences and their
natural derivative products are patent-ineligible products of nature but that a new,
individually distinct gene sequence derived from natural genes is patent eligible);
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012)
(finding that a method for calibrating the proper dosage of certain drugs that treat
autoimmune diseases to be a patent-ineligible law of nature); Bilski v. Kappos, 561
U.S. 593, 599, 612 (2010) (ruling that a process of managing risk in commodities
trading was an unpatentable abstract idea).
8. See infra Part I.B-D (examining the Federal Circuit's decisions in Ultramercial,
LLC v. Hulu, LLC (Ultramercial 1), 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom.
WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012); Ultramercial, Inc. v.
Hulu, LLC (Ultramercial I1), 722 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013), vacated sub nom.
WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 2870 (2014); and Ultramercial, Inc.
v. Hulu, LLC (Ultramercial II), 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014), and the intervening
Supreme Court decisions in Mayo and Alice Corp.).
9. 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
10. 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. WildTangent, Inc. v.
Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012).
11. Id. at 1324, 1328.
12. 722 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013), vacated sub nom. WildTangent, Inc. v.
Ultramercial, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 2870 (2014).
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decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.3
Less than one year later, the Federal Circuit invalidated the patent in
its third review of Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC4 (" Ultramercial II'),
which was reconsidered in light of the Supreme Court's 2014
decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International.5  This Note
concentrates on these cases, paying close attention to how the
intervening Supreme Court decisions affected the Federal Circuit's
analysis of Ultramercial's patent.
This Note begins by addressing the patent eligibility of computer-
implemented inventions and the state of the abstract idea exception
after the Supreme Court's decision in Bilski. Second, this Note traces
the path carved out by the Federal Circuit in Ultramercial I,
Ultramercial II, and Ultramercial III in its attempt to reconcile the
Supreme Court's decisions addressing subject matter eligibility in
Mayo and Alice Corp.. Finally, this Note concludes that Alice Corp. and
the cases since represent significant movement towards a narrower
interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 101, but the USPTO's most recent
guidance presents a real opportunity for stability in the interpretation
of subject matter eligibility.
I. ULTRAMERCIAL AND THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE THE BOUNDARIES OF
PATENT ELIGIBILITY
Courts have consistently grappled with the patentability of software
and business methods, or computer-related processes,6 since the
early 1970s.7 The threshold step in determining patentability is
presented by 35 U.S.C. § 101, which states, "Whoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
13. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
14. 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
15. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
16. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2012) (defining "process" as a "process, art or method
[that] includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of
matter, or material"); see also Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787 (1876) (stating
that processes are indisputably patentable).
17. See In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 764 (C.C.P.A. 1980) ("The determination of
statutory subject matter under § 101 in the field [of computer-implemented
inventions] has proved to be one of the most difficult and controversial issues in
patent law."), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), affd on
other grounds sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Mark A. Lemley et al.,
Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1317 (2011) (noting that "[t]he patentability
of software and business methods has a long and tortured history" and that the
Supreme Court began this struggle in the 1970s with "mathematical algorithm and
software patents").
1092 [Vol. 64:1089
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composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title."'8 In analyzing § 101, the Supreme Court
has declared that Congress intended these four categories of patent-
eligible subject matter to be read as broad and inclusive to meet the
constitutional objective of the patent system-to encourage
innovation.9 A claimed invention that is deemed patent eligible may
proceed to a determination of its patentability.
20
Even if a claimed invention fits into one of the four statutory
categories, the claim may fall within one of the three judicially
created exceptions to patent eligibility: "laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas."' 2' In establishing these exceptions,
the Court has held that these fundamental discoveries embody "the
basic tools of scientific and technological work."22 Patents covering
these elemental concepts would thus reach too far and claim too
much.23  Courts have struggled to develop a framework for
18. 35 U.S.C. § 101; see Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010) ("The § 101
patent-eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test.").
19. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (interpreting the
patent laws as having a "wide scope" because Congress used the modifier "any" in
connection with broad terms like "manufacture" and "composition of matter"
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting
Congress the power "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries").
20. To obtain a patent, an invention must also meet the utility, novelty,
nonobvious, and written description requirements of the Patent Act. See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101-03, 112 (providing the conditions and requirements necessary to obtain a
patent on an invention or discovery).
21. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) ("'A principle, in the abstract, is
a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no
one can claim in either of them an exclusive right."' (quoting Le Roy v. Tatham, 55
U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853))).
22. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). Through these judicially
created exceptions, a new mineral discovered in the earth; Einstein's E=mc2, or the
law of gravity; and a novel and useful mathematical formula are patent-ineligible laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas, respectively. U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106 (9th ed. 2014)
[hereinafter MPEP].
23. Compare Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124,
126-27 (2006) (BreyerJ., dissenting) (describing the justification for the exceptions
as being "that sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than promote
[innovation]" (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) (highlighting the danger in
applying the judicially created exceptions too aggressively because "all inventions at
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
determining whether a claimed invention directed to one of these
exceptions is eligible for patent protection.2 4 As Judge Lourie noted
in Alice Corp., "[t]he difficulty lies in consistently and predictably
differentiating between, on the one hand, claims that would tie up
laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas, and, on the
other, claims that merely 'embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply'
those fundamental tools."2
A. The State of Patentability After Bilski
The Supreme Court first attempted to address the patent eligibility
of computer-implemented inventions in a trilogy of cases in the 1970s
and 1980s- Gottschalk v. Benson,26 Parker v. Flook,27 and Diamond v.
Diehr.28 In Benson, the Court evaluated claims directed to a numerical
algorithm and applied the machine-or-transformation test for the
first time.29 Under the machine-or-transformation test, a claimed
invention is patent-eligible subject matter if "(1) it is tied to a
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular
article into a different state or thing."3" Ultimately, the Court applied
what is now referred to as the abstract idea exception and found the
claims too abstract to be eligible for patent protection because they
covered all known and unknown uses of the mathematical formula.31
In Rook, the Court ruled ineligible claims to a method for using an
algorithm to continuously update alarm limits during a chemical
some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas").
24. See Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC (Ultramerciall), 657 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (acknowledging that Supreme Court Justices and Federal Circuit judges
"have recognized the difficulty of providing a precise formula or definition for the
judge-made ineligible category of abstractness" (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593,
621 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring))), vacated sub nom. WildTangent, Inc. v.
Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012).
25. CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc)
(LourieJ., concurring) (per curiam) (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293), aff'd, 134 S.
Ct. 2347 (2014).
26. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
27. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
28. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
29. Benson, 409 U.S. at 64, 70.
30. In reBilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds
sub. nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 593 (2010).
31. Benson, 409 U.S. at 68, 71-72 (reasoning that if a patented method for
converting decimals into binary numerals was upheld, it would effectively be "a
patent on the algorithm itself").
1094 [Vol. 64:1089
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND ULTRAMERCIAL
conversion process.2 Unlike the claims in Benson, the claims in Flook
did not cover every potential application of the formula because they
were limited to a specific field of use due to the inclusion of "specific
'post-solution' activity. '"" However, the Court rejected the notion
that adding "post-solution activity" to an unpatentable principle can
create a patentable process.3 4
Almost a decade after Benson, the Court in Diehr finally recognized
that a computer program might deserve patent protection.5 In Diehr,
the Court evaluated claims protecting a computerized process for
"molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision
products" using a mathematical formula.3 6 Despite clear recitation of
a mathematical formula and a programmed computer in the steps of
the process, the Court found the claims to be patent eligible. 7
Relying on the fact that the claims did not attempt to preempt the
mathematical formula itself and instead sought "to foreclose from
others the use of that [formula] in conjunction with all of the other
steps in their claimed process," the Court differentiated the method
in Diehr from those in Benson and Flook as being the protected
application of an abstract idea to a narrow field.38 With Diehr, the
Court opened the door to the possibility of obtaining a patent on
software by acknowledging that the presence of a computer program,
digital computer, or mathematical formula in a claim does not
render it ineligible.39
32. Hook, 437 U.S. at 585-86, 594.
33. Id. at 586, 590 (describing "the adjustment of the alarm limit to the figure
computed according to the formula" mentioned in the claims as "specific 'post-
solution' activity").
34. Id. at 590 (suggesting that "[a] competent draftsman could attach some form
of post-solution activity to almost any mathematical formula").
35. See Christopher Bergin, Comment, Take Off Your Genes and Let the Doctor Have
a Look: Why the Mayo and Myriad Decisions Have Invalidated Method Claims for Genetic
Diagnostic Testing, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 173, 181 (2013) (describing the Court's ruling in
Diehras the first time it explicitly validated a method patent containing an algorithm).
36. Diamondv. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981).
37. Id. at 184-85.
38. Id. at 187.
39. Id.; see Robert A. Kreiss, Patent Protection for Computer Programs and
Mathematical Algorithms: The Constitutional Limitations on Patentable Subject Matter, 29
N.M. L. REV. 31, 40 (1999) (characterizing Diehras the Supreme Court's "green-light"
to attorneys that software could be patented); Matthew Ocksrider, Note, Patentability
of Computer Software and Business Methods Post-Bilski: A New Hope, 14 J. TECH. L. &
POL'Y 179, 187 (2009) (describing Diehr as "[tihe genesis of the expansion of
patentable subject matter into the realm of computer software process patents").
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In 2010, the Court attempted to reconcile these three cases in
Bilski, where it affirmed the Federal Circuit's decision rejecting the
claims as covering a patent-ineligible abstract idea.40 The claims in
Bilski were directed to a process of hedging risk in commodities
trading by investing in other segments of the energy industry.41 The
Court rationalized that "[a] llowing [a patent for] risk hedging would
pre-empt use of [the] approach in all fields, and would effectively
grant a monopoly over an abstract idea."42  The Court also
reprimanded the Federal Circuit for not following Benson, Flook, and
Diehr and for limiting the analysis exclusively to the "machine-or-
transformation" test.4" Instead, the Supreme Court noted that the
"machine-or-transformation" test is merely instructive-"a useful and
important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some
claimed inventions are processes under § 101."
44
The Court in Bilski also addressed business methods and rejected
their categorical exclusion from patent eligibility.45 The majority
opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, points to the definitions of
"process" and "method" and the language of 35 U.S.C. § 273-which
for purposes of a defense to infringement alone defined a "method"
as "a method of doing or conducting business"-as proof of
legislative intent to leave open patents to business methods.46
However, the concurrence written by Justice Stevens and joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor would have found the
claims patent ineligible because they were directed to a business
method, and "business methods are not patentable.
4 7
Following this decision, software and business methods remained
patentable despite continued opposition, even in the Supreme Court.
40. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612-13 (2010) (pointing to the Supreme
Court's decisions in Benson, Flook, and Diehr as the "guideposts" for determining what
constitutes a patentable process).
41. Id. at 599.
42. Id. at 611-12.
43. See id. at 602-04 (dismissing the notion that the "machine-or-
transformation test" is the sole test to determine what constitutes a patentable
process because "[t] he Court is unaware of any 'ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning' of the definitional terms 'process, art or method' that would require
these terms to be tied to a machine or to transform an article" (citation omitted)
(quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182)).
44. Id. at 604.
45. See id. at 606 ("Section 101 similarly precludes the broad contention that the
term 'process' categorically excludes business methods.").
46. Id. at 607-08 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (3) (2006)).
47. Id. at 614 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that "a claim that merely
describes a method of doing business does not qualify as a 'process' under § 101").
[Vol. 64:10891096
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The USPTO subsequently released an exhaustive list of factors to aid
in determining what constitutes a patent-eligible computer-
implemented process.4 8
B. Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC: The Journey Begins
In 2011, Ultramercial appealed the dismissal of its patent
infringement claim, which the district court had dismissed on the
ground that Ultramercial's U.S. Patent No. 7,346,545 ("the '545
patent") failed to claim patent-eligible subject matter.4" This patent
covered a method for distributing copyrighted works via the Internet,
whereby advertisers pay for the copyrighted content and allow the
consumer to gain access to the content free of charge after the
consumer views an advertisement.51 Claim 1 of the '545 patent provides:
A method for distribution of products over the Internet via a
facilitator, said method comprising the steps of:
a first step of receiving, from a content provider, media products
that are covered by intellectual-property rights protection and are
available for purchase, wherein each said media product being
comprised of at least one of text data, music data, and video data;
a second step of selecting a sponsor message to be associated
with the media product, said sponsor message being selected from
a plurality of sponsor messages, said second step including
accessing an activity log to verify that the total number of times
which the sponsor message has been previously presented is less
than the number of transaction cycles contracted by the sponsor of
the sponsor message;
a third step of providing the media product for sale at an
Internet website;
a fourth step of restricting general public access to said
media product;
48. See Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process
Claims in View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,922, 43,925 (July 27, 2010)
(listing factors that weigh for and against patent eligibility, including criteria
provided by the machine-or-transformation test and whether an "abstract idea has
been practically applied").
49. Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC (Ultramercial 1), 657 F.3d 1323, 1324
(Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S.
Ct. 2431 (2012).
50. Id.; Method & Sys. for Payment of Intellectual Prop. Royalties by Interposed
Sponsor on Behalf of Consumer over a Telecomms. Network, U.S. Patent No.
7,346,545 col. 2, 11. 44-57 (filed May 29, 2001).
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a fifth step of offering to a consumer access to the media
product without charge to the consumer on the precondition that
the consumer views the sponsor message;
a sixth step of receiving from the consumer a request to view the
sponsor message, wherein the consumer submits said request in
response to being offered access to the media product;
a seventh step of, in response to receiving the request from
the consumer, facilitating the display of a sponsor message to
the consumer;
an eighth step of, if the sponsor message is not an interactive
message, allowing said consumer access to said media product after
said step of facilitating the display of said sponsor message;
a ninth step of, if the sponsor message is an interactive message,
presenting at least one query to the consumer and allowing said
consumer access to said media product after receiving a response
to said at least one query;
a tenth step of recording the transaction event to the activity log,
said tenth step including updating the total number of times the
sponsor message has been presented; and
an eleventh step of receiving payment from the sponsor of the
sponsor message displayed.51
Ultramercial alleged that Hulu, YouTube, and WildTangent
infringed the '545 patent.52 Hulu and YouTube were dismissed from
the case, and WildTangent's successful motion to dismiss resulted in
this appeal."
In the decision written by former Chief Judge Rader,5 4 the Federal
Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that "the claimed invention
is not 'so manifestly abstract as to override the statutory language of
section 101."'" After highlighting the broad interpretation of § 101
and subject matter eligibility intended by Congress,56 the court
discussed the judicially created exceptions to patent eligibility and
the problems encountered when interpreting the "abstractness" of
51. '545 Patent col. 8, 11. 5-48.
52. UltramercialI, 657 F.3d at 1325.
53. Id.
54. During his time on the Federal Circuit, former ChiefJudge Rader's expansive
view of what constitutes patent-eligible subject matter was well documented. See, e.g.,
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1073-75 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (Rader, C.J., opinion) (highlighting public policy reasons why the Federal
Circuit "should decline to accept invitations to restrict subject matter eligibility").
55. Ultramercial I, 657 F.3d at 1330 (quoting Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft
Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
56. See id. at 1325-26; supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the
expansive nature of § 101 and subject matter eligibility).
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claimed inventions falling specifically within the § 101 "process"
category.57 The court acknowledged that the '545 patent was indeed
a "method" under the definition of "process" in § 100(b) because the
Supreme Court in Bilski made clear that a "'method' may include
even methods of doing business."58
Before turning to the '545 patent, the Federal Circuit disclaimed its
past reliance on the machine-or-transformation test and recognized
the difficulty in devising a clear test to determine whether a claimed
invention constitutes an ineligible abstract idea.9 Revisiting Benson,
,Hook, and Diehr, the court clarified that although abstract ideas are
not patent-eligible subject matter, the application of an abstract idea
may well be patent eligible if applied "to a 'new and useful end."'6
The Federal Circuit thus performed its § 101 analysis on the
"abstractness of the subject matter" in the '545 patent by focusing on
whether the claimed invention amounted to a practical application of
an abstract idea.6'
The Federal Circuit held that the concept of using advertising as
currency is just as abstract as the concept of hedging-the subject
matter of the patent-ineligible method from Bilski.2 However, the
court determined that, unlike the patent in Bilski, the '545 patent
claims a practical application of its idea.63  Specifically, the
"computers and applications of computer technology" involved in the
'545 patent and the "extensive computer interface" disclosed were
sufficient to raise the claimed invention beyond just an abstract idea
to a patent-eligible practical application of an abstract idea.6'
The court also addressed the contested status of patents to
software, referencing the Federal Circuit's en banc decision in In re
57. UltramercialI, 657 F.3d at 1326-27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593,
606-07 (2010)); see supra note 16 (providing the definition of "process" under title 35).
59. Ultramercial 1, 657 F.3d at 1327; see supra text accompanying notes 25, 30
(describing the difficulty posed when creating tests to apply the judicially created
exceptions to subject matter eligibility and providing the inquiry at the heart of the
machine-or-transformation test).
60. Ultramercial 1, 657 F.3d at 1327 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972)); cf Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) ("It is now commonplace
that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure
or process may well be deserving of patent protection.").
61. Ultramerciall, 657 F.3d at 1328-29.
62. Id. at 1328; see also Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611 (describing hedging as a basic
concept used to protect against risk).
63. Ultramercial I,657 F.3d at 1328.
64. Id.
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Alappat.6' That decision is often cited for famously equating a
general purpose computer having computer programming with a
patent-eligible "special purpose computer," opening up the patenting
of software in terms of the hardware it employs.66 While the court
recognized that the '545 patent fails to disclose the particular
mechanism-or hardware-utilized to deliver the copyrighted works
to the consumer, the failure to do so "does not render the claimed
subject matter impermissibly abstract."67 Rather, the disclosure of
particular instrumentalities or hardware is outside the § 101 analysis
and should remain part of the written description and enablement
requirements of § 112.68
The Federal Circuit's decision in Ultramercial Iwas proof of judicial
uncertainty regarding subject matter eligibility in the wake of Bilski.
Just two weeks prior to Ultramercial I, the Federal Circuit ruled on
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.69 and invalidated a patented
method for verifying Internet credit card transactions using "Internet
address information," such as email addresses, IP addresses, and MAC
addresses."v  The Federal Circuit attempted to reconcile these
decisions in Ultramercial Iby stating that the claims in the '545 patent
"require, among other things, controlled interaction with a consumer
via an Internet website, something far removed from purely mental
steps,"71 while the claims in CyberSource could "be performed entirely
in a human's mind."72 However, the tension between these decisions
65. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc); Ultramercial1, 657 F.3d at 1328-29
(citing In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545).
66. See In reAlappat, 33 F.3d at 1545 (explaining that general purpose computers
become special purpose computers when software programs them to perform
specific tasks); see alsoJulie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in
the Software Industy, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9 (2001) (describing how patent attorneys
patented software by claiming it as "hardware devices, pizza ovens, and other
machines" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
67. UltramercialI, 657 F.3d at 1329.
68. See id. ("[W]ritten description and enablement are conditions for
patentability that title 35 sets 'wholly apart from whether the invention falls into a
category of statutory subject matter."' (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 190
(1981))). The written description requirement demands that the patent
specification adequately describe the invention such that a person of ordinary skill in
the art may understand the invention and know that the inventor actually invented
what is claimed; the enablement requirement demands that the invention be
described such that one of ordinary skill in the art may make and use the invention
without undue experimentation. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
69. 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
70. Id. at 1367, 1376-77 (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. Ultramercial I,657 F.3d at 1330.
72. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1374-76.
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was clear,73 and it set the stage for the Supreme Court to once again
address subject matter eligibility.
C. Searching for "Meaningful Limitations" in Ultramercial II Despite
Mayo's "Inventive Concept"
In 2012, the Supreme Court revisited § 101 and patent eligibility in
Mayo, where the Court unanimously found claims directed to
methods for administering the correct dosage of thiopurine drugs to
treat autoimmune disease unpatentable because they claimed a "law
of nature."74 Relying on its rationale in Flook, the Supreme Court
held that an unpatentable law of nature is not transformed into a
patent-eligible application thereof by merely adding conventional or
obvious pre- or post-solution activity.75 The referenced obvious pre-
solution activity was a "determining step" that instructed doctors to
"determine the level of the relevant metabolites in the blood,
through whatever process the doctor or the laboratory wishes to
use."76 The Court described this claim element as a "well-understood,
routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by [those who
work] in the field."77
Even though the patent was not directed to software or a business
method, the Court's decision in Mayo proclaimed a methodology for
determining patent eligibility that is still used in cases directed at
computer-implemented inventions today.78  Again relying on its
rationale in Flook, the Supreme Court looked to whether the use of
the patent-ineligible concept also contains an "inventive concept,"
such as other elements or a combination of elements "sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than
73. SeeJonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 530 & n.256 (2011)
(recognizing the "halting, conflicted fashion" with which the Federal Circuit
attempted to sort out § 101 through CyberSource and Ultramercial I); Recent Case,
Patent Law-Patentable Subject Matter-Federal Circuit Holds That Mental Processes That
Do Not, As a Practical Matter, Require a Computer to Be Performed Are Unpatentable.-
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011), 125 HARv.
L. REv. 851, 857 (2012) (discussing the tension evident in the Federal Circuit's
rulings in CyberSource and Ultramercial 1).
74. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Id. at 1298 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)).
76. Id. at 1297 (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Id. at 1294.
78. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (identifying
the "framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of
those concepts" (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1296-98)).
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a patent upon the natural law itself."79 Returning to the analysis in
Flook only muddied the waters because in order to pass the § 101
patent-eligibility threshold, a computer-implemented invention must
now contain an "inventive concept" beyond the mere application of a
mathematical algorithm or formula and beyond concepts already in
practice by those in the field.
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit's
decision in Ultramercial I and remanded the case to the Federal
Circuit for further consideration in light of the Court's decision in
Mayo.s° In another decision written by former Chief Judge Rader,"'
the court in Ultramercial II stated that the appropriate inquiry for
determining patent eligibility under § 101 is "whether a claim, as a
whole, includes meaningful limitations" that restrict the claimed
invention to an application of an abstract idea rather than merely
claiming the abstract idea itself.8 2 In performing this inquiry, the
court once again found that the claimed invention in Ultramercial's
'545 patent "[wa]s not 'so manifestly abstract as to override the
statutory language of section 101.'"'3
Prior to looking to the claims of the '545 patent, the court outlined
the Supreme Court's guidance for determining whether a claim seeks
to monopolize an abstract idea itself rather than an application of
that abstract idea.4 To begin with, a claim is not meaningfully
limited if it does nothing more than describe an abstract idea or a
simple application thereof8 5 A patent with claims that cover every
practical application of an abstract idea is also not meaningfully
limited. 6 As the Supreme Court articulated in Mayo, a claim will
similarly not be meaningfully limited "if it contains only insignificant
or token pre- or post-solution activity-such as identifying a relevant
79. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Flook,
437 U.S. at 594).
80. WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012).
81. See supra note 54 (mentioning Chief Judge Rader's expansive approach to
subject matter eligibility).
82. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC (Ultramercial I), 722 F.3d 1335, 1344
(Fed. Cir. 2013), vacated sub nom. WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 134 S.
Ct. 2870 (2014).
83. Id. at 1354 (quoting Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859,
869 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
84. See id. at 1345-49 (chronicling Supreme Court precedent regarding
meaningful limitations in a claim).
85. Id. at 1345 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.
Ct. 1289, 1294, 1297 (2012)).
86. Id.
1102 [Vol. 64:1089
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND ULTRAMERCIAL
audience, a category of use, field of use, or technological
environment."87 Additionally, a claim does not contain meaningful
limitations "if its purported limitations provide no real direction,
cover all possible ways to achieve the provided result, or are overly-
generalized."88  Finally, a claim that passes the machine-or-
transformation test likely contains meaningful limitations.89
The court also reviewed the specific guidelines critical to analyzing
meaningful limitations in computer-implemented inventions. The
court noted that "the mere reference to a general purpose computer
will not save a method claim from being deemed too abstract to be
patent eligible."9" However, if the method is tied to the computer or
machine and, as a result, does not preempt every practical
application of the abstract idea, it will likely be patent eligible.91
Further, the claim is more likely to be meaningfully limited if the
computer is integral to either the performance or solution of the
method.92 Ultimately, the presence of a computer will lead to a claim
being found patent eligible if the claim is "tied to a computer in a
specific way, such that the computer plays a meaningful role in the
performance of the claimed invention," thus ensuring that the claim
does not preempt all uses of the abstract idea.93
Applying these principles, the Federal Circuit determined, for the
second time, that the claims in the '545 patent clearly require the use
of computers, the Internet, and activity in cyberspace for the
invention to meet its intended purpose.94 Claim 1 of the '545 patent
is a specific application of an abstract idea involving "an extensive
computer interface."95 As a result, the court held that the claimed
invention did not preempt all practical applications of the abstract
87. Id. at 1346; see supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (summarizing the
Supreme Court's decision in Mayo).
88. UltramercialII, 722 F.3d at 1346.
89. See id. at 1347; supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (detailing the
Supreme Court's take on the appropriate weight to give the machine-or-
transformation test).
90. UltramerciallI, 722 F.3d at 1348.
91. See id. ("This inquiry focuses on whether the claims tie the otherwise abstract
idea to a specific way of doing something with a computer, or a specific computer for
doing something; if so, they likely will be patent eligible.").
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1349.
94. See id. at 1350; see also supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (describing
the Federal Circuit's analysis of the '545 patent in Ultramercial 1).
95. See Ultramercial II, 722 F.3d at 1350, 1352; see also supra note 51 and
accompanying text (providing the text of Claim 1 of the '545 patent, the disputed
claim in each of the three Ultramercial decisions).
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idea or recite token pre- or post-solution steps and, therefore, was
meaningfully limited.96 The court again clarified that its decision did
not articulate what is required of a patent-eligible computer-
implemented invention but merely that the claims in the '545 patent
were indeed patent eligible.97
The court cautioned against a test for patent eligibility that
contains the "inventive concept" language found in Mayo."8 It was
concerned that a patent-eligibility analysis that seeks an "inventive
concept" will conflate § 101 with the other conditions of
patentability.99 The court viewed the Supreme Court's mention of
"inventiveness" in Mayo to be more akin to an interpretation of
whether the claimed method merely requires the essential steps
necessary to implement or make use of an abstract idea.0 If all the
steps in a claimed invention are "those that anyone wanting to use the
natural law would necessarily use," the claimed invention is not
meaningfully limited.1 The additional, or "inventive," steps "must
be more than 'routine' or 'conventional' to confer patent eligibility."10 2
Judge Lourie filed a concurring opinion in which he admonished
an analysis that does not "faithfully" follow recent Supreme Court
decisions, specifically referring to Mayo."3  According to Judge
Lourie, the test should look to whether there is any risk that the
claims preempt the use of an abstract idea by first identifying the
abstract idea embodied in the claim and then evaluating the balance
of the claim to determine whether "additional substantive
limitations.., narrow, confine, or otherwise tie down the claim so
that, in practical terms, it does not cover the full abstract idea
96. UltramercialfI, 722 F.3d at 1352.
97. See id. at 1353 (repeating language from Ultramercial I in which the court
limited potential interpretation of its decision); see also Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu,
LLC (Ultramercial 1), 657 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("This court does not
define the level of programming complexity required before a computer-
implemented method can be patent-eligible. Nor does this court hold that use of an
Internet website to practice such a method is either necessary or sufficient in every
case to satisfy § 101."), vacated sub nom. WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132
S. Ct. 2431 (2012).
98. UltramercialI, 722 F.3d at 1347-48 (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. See id.; see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1303-04 (2012) (acknowledging the danger in shifting the § 101 analysis to an
inquiry more in line with §§ 102, 103, and 112); supra note 20 (outlining the other
requirements necessary to btain a patent).
100. Ultramercial II, 722 F.3d at 1348 (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1347 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294, 1298-99).
103. Id. at 1354 (Lourie,J., concurring).
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itself." °4 Under this analysisJudge Lourie would, however, still have
found the claims to constitute patent-eligible subject matter under
§ 101 because the added limitations "represent[ed] significantly
more than Uust] the underlying abstract idea.""5 Despite once again
concurring in the result reached by the court, Judge Lourie's repeated
criticism of the approach taken in reaching that result presaged what
transpired in the court's third bite at the Ultramercial apple.
D. Following Alice Corp., the Federal Circuit Finds the Claims Ineligible
in Ultramercial III
Just two months prior to its decision in Ultramercial II, the Federal
Circuit delivered its now infamous opinion in CLS Bank International
v. Alice Corp.'°6 Sitting en banc, the ten-judge panel issued a per
curiam decision that affirmed the ineligibility of Alice's claims to
computer-implemented methods, computer-readable media
("CRM"), and computer systems implementing the methods.17 The
patents in question were directed to mitigating settlement risk in
financial transactions by using a computer system as a third-party
intermediary (effectively a system for setting up an escrow). °s
Including former Chief Judge Rader's additional reflections, the
court released seven different opinions, with no single opinion
garnering majority support.09
104. Id. at 1355 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. Id. (noting broadly that the implementation of the "complex computer
program" at issue does not preempt the abstract idea of "using advertising as an
exchange or currency" in all fields).
106. 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (per curiam), aff'd, 134 S. Ct.
2347 (2014).
107. Id. at 1273; see Ryan Davis, "Nightmare" Ruling on Software Patent Standard
Baffles Attys, LAW360 (May 13, 2013, 9:37 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
440975/nightmare-ruling-on-software-patent-standard-baffles-attys (describing the
Federal Circuit's "nightmare" decision as "ma[king] it all but impossible to know
whether software patents will survive scrutiny in future cases"); John Kong, The Alice
in Wonderland En Banc Decision by the Federal Circuit in CLS Bank v. Alice Corp,
IPWATCHDOG (May 14, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/05/14/the-alice-
in-wonderland-en-banc-decision-by-the-federal-circuit-in-cls-bank-v-alice-corp/id=40344
(discussing how, like Alice in Wonderland, Alice Corp. must feel "bewildered and
frightened by the fantastical situation" the decision created); see also In re Beauregard,
53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (establishing patent eligibility for claims to
computer-readable medium, now commonly referred to as a "Beauregard claim").
108. CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1286 (Lourie,J., concurring).
109. See id. at 1270 (listing the several opinions); see also id. at 1333-36 (Rader,
C.J., additional opinion) (discussing the case in light of his twenty-five years of
judicial experience).
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In June 2014, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Alice
Corp. The Court announced a test for determining § 101 eligibility,
which asks first "whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-
ineligible concept.""0 If they are, the second inquiry asks whether
the claim's elements, considered "both individually and as an
ordered combination.... transform the nature of the claim into a
patent-eligible application.""'
Aside from this test, the Court did not provide significant guidance
for handling patents directed to computer-implemented
inventions.1 12  In describing the framework for performing the
second inquiry above, however, the Court did look to the language in
Mayo that requires "search[ing] for an 'inventive concept'-i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that
the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.' 11 In performing this analysis,
the Court unanimously invalidated the patent claims, holding that,
like the concept of risk hedging in Bilski, "the concept of
intermediated settlement" in Alice Corp. fell "squarely within the
realm of abstract ideas," and that all of the claims, "which merely
require generic computer implementation, fail to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention."
' 4
In essence, the analysis from Alice Corp. requires determining
whether a patent attempts to claim an abstract idea by looking at
whether the claimed invention contains an inventive concept
sufficient to create a patent-eligible application of that abstract
idea." In simplest terms, the analysis requires more than merely
reciting an abstract idea performed on a generic computer.16 This
110. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). If not, the claims
are directed to patent-eligible subject matter. Id.
111. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. See Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Deputy Comm'r for Patent
Examination Policy, to Patent Examining Corps 2 (June 25, 2014), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/patents/announce/aice-pec-25jun2Ol4.pdf
(stating that "the basic inquiries to determine subject matter eligibility remain the
same"). But see 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed.
Reg. 74,618, 74,619 (Dec. 16, 2014) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1)
(supplementing the preliminary examination instructions released immediately
following the Alice Corp. decision); infra Part II.B (discussing the USPTO's newest
guidelines for examiners assessing patent eligibility).
113. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012)).
114. Id. at 2357 (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. Id. (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294, 1298).
116. Id. at2358-59.
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language attempts to make clear that the § 101 inquiry cannot
depend simply on the skills of a clever draftsman; instead, an
inventive concept is necessary. Ultimately, the opinion fell in line
with the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Bilski and Mayo, which
found claims ineligible, but the Court once again passed on the
opportunity to describe what is eligible.'17
The most troublesome aspect of the Alice Corp. decision for
proponents of business method patents is Justice Sotomayor's
endorsement, in a concurrence, of the position that a "claim that
merely describes a method of doing business does not qualify as a
'process' under § 101."1"8 Justice Sotomayor's concurrence, joined by
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer, follows Justice Stevens's
concurring opinion in Bilski where he argued at length for
categorically excluding business methods from patent eligibility.119
The majority in Bilski relied on 35 U.S.C. § 273 as proof that
Congress intended business methods to be eligible for patent
protection.1 20 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act has since done
away with that language.21 While business methods remain patent
eligible, the decision in Alice Corp. and the reality that a significant
contingent of the Supreme Court disfavors patent protection for
business methods will likely lead to increased scrutiny for business
method claims going forward.
122
Less than two weeks after deciding Alice Corp., the Supreme Court
vacated the Federal Circuit's decision in Ultramercial II, once again
remanding the case to the Federal Circuit but this time for further
consideration in light of Alice Corp.. 21 Judge Lourie wrote the
decision in Ultramercial III, in which the court ruled the claims in
117. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (finding a method for administering the correct
dosage of thiopurine drugs to treat autoimmune disease patent ineligible for
claiming a law of nature); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010) (finding a
method for hedging-a risk management process in commodities trading-to be a
patent-ineligible abstract idea).
118. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2360 (SotomayorJ., concurring) (quoting Bilski, 561
U.S. at 614 (Stevens,J., concurring)).
119. See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 626-57 (Stevens, J., concurring) (disclaiming the
majority's broad interpretation of the term "process" and its reliance on § 273 while
maintaining that the method was not a process because it describes a business
method, which were not traditionally patentable).
120. See id. at 607-08.
121. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (3) (2006) (defining "method" as "a method of
doing or conducting business"), with 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012) (omitting any mention
of business methods).
122. See infta Part II.A (discussing Alice Corp.'s effect on patent eligibility).
123. WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 2870 (2014).
11072015]
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the '545 patent were ineligible under § 101.14 En route to affirming
the district court's initial ruling, the court held that the claims in
the '545 patent were "directed to no more than a patent-ineligible
abstract idea."
1 25
Strictly adhering to the framework articulated by the Supreme
Court in Alice Corp.,126 the court began by identifying in the '545
patent the patent-ineligible "abstract idea of showing an
advertisement before delivering free content."27  In searching for
"additional features" representing an "inventive concept" that
transforms the abstract idea into a patent-eligible application of an
abstract idea, the court determined that "updating an activity log,
requiring a request from the consumer to view the ad, restrictions on
public access, and use of the Internet" amounted to merely routine,
conventional activity that adds no practical significance to the
abstract idea.12' Adding these routine steps and limiting the
technological environment to the Internet, the court held, failed to
add an inventive concept to the claimed abstract idea.
129
The court then looked to the machine-or-transformation test for a
"useful clue" in determining the claim's patent eligibility under
§ 101.' According to the court, the '545 patent failed the machine-
or-transformation test because a general purpose computer and
invocation of the Internet did not satisfy the machine prong of the
test."' Further, the "grant of permission and viewing of an
advertisement by the consumer, the grant of access by the content
124. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC (Utramercial I1), 772 F.3d 709, 712 (Fed.
Cir. 2014); see also supra notes 67, 83 and accompanying text (summarizing the
Federal Circuit's holdings in Ultramercial I and Ultramercial II where the court found
that the claims in the '545 patent were directed to patent-eligible subject matter).
125. Ultramercialll, 772 F.3d at 717.
126. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text (providing the framework
the Court articulated in Alice Corp. for determining whether the subject matter of
a patent falls within one of the judicially created exceptions to patent-eligible
subject matter).
127. Ultramercial 1II, 772 F.3d at 715.
128. Id. at 715-16; see also Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357
(2014) ("A claim that recites an abstract idea must include 'additional features' to
ensure 'that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea]."' (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289,1297 (2012))).
129. UltramercialII, 772 F.3d at 716.
130. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
131. Id. at 716-17.
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provider, and the exchange of money between the sponsor and the
content provider" failed to satisfy the transformation prong of the test.
132
II. PATENT ELIGIBILITY AFTER ULTRAMERCIAL
The Federal Circuit's decision in Ultramercial III demonstrates the
undeniable expansion of the judicially created exceptions to § 101
wrought by the Supreme Court's decisions in Bilski, Mayo, and Alice
Corp. By finding ineligible a patent it had twice before ruled eligible,
the Federal Circuit exemplified this shift. The Supreme Court
remains reluctant to provide a straightforward answer to what
constitutes patent-eligible subject matter. However, the USPTO's
recent guidance may obviate the need for a straightforward answer by
providing examiners with the instruction they need to definitively
determine whether a claimed invention constitutes patent-eligible
subject matter.
1 3
A. Alice Corp. 's Effect on Patent Eligibility
In Judge Moore's dissent-in-part from the Federal Circuit's per
curiam decision in Alice Corp., she articulated what she believed the
en banc Federal Circuit's decision would accomplish:
[L]et's be clear: if all of these claims, including the system claims,
are not patent-eligible, this case is the death of hundreds of
thousands of patents, including all business method, financial
system, and software patents as well as many computer
implemented and telecommunications patents. My colleagues
believe that the trajectory the Supreme Court has set for § 101
requires us to conclude that all of the claims at issue here are
directed to unpatentable subject matter. Respectfully, my
colleagues are wrong.134
Judge Moore summarized what she referred to as "a free fall in the
patent system" created by both the Supreme Court and Federal
Circuit's struggle to explicitly define patentable subject matter. 135
132. Id. at 717 (explaining that manipulations of abstractions cannot meet the
transformation prong of the machine-or-transformation test since they are neither
actually nor representative of physical objects or substances).
133. See generally 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79
Fed. Reg. 74,618 (Dec. 16, 2014) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (providing
guidance in view of the Supreme Court's decision in Alice Corp.).
134. CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en
banc) (Moore,J., dissenting in part) (per curiam) (footnote omitted), affd, 134 S.
Ct. 2347 (2014).
135. Id. See generally Robert E. Thomas, Debugging Software Patents: Increasing
Innovation and Reducing Uncertainty in the Judicial Reform of Software Patent Law, 25
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While the actual results of the claims being found patent ineligible
are likely much less severe, Ultramercial III and other federal court
decisions since the Supreme Court's decision in Alice Corp. have
demonstrated a clear shift in the federal courts toward a narrower
view of what constitutes patent-eligible subject matter.136 Since the
Supreme Court's decision in Alice Corp., the Federal Circuit has ruled
on the eligibility of claims directed to computer-implemented
inventions six times-five times ruling the claims ineligible137 and
only once finding the claims eligible.13 The outcome of these cases
might not explicitly indicate a trend towards a more restrictive § 101
because they may have not turned out any differently prior to Alice
Corp., but there is no dispute that requiring a claimed invention
contain an "inventive concept" results in a narrower approach to
§ 101 than that performed by the Court in Bilski.3 9
Nowhere has the effect of the Supreme Court's narrow
interpretation of patent eligibility in Alice Corp. been more prominent
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 191, 224-27 (2008) (noting, in reference
to the legal uncertainties in patent law, that "[i]nconsistency in decision-making
reduces confidence in the process, increases transactions costs, and raises questions
about the appropriate allocation of rights").
136. See Timothy B. Lee, Software Patents Are Crumbling, Thanks to the Supreme Court,
Vox (Sept. 12, 2014, 3:50 PM), http://www.vox.com/2014/9/12/6138483/software-
patents-are-crumbling-thanks-to-the-supreme-court (summarizing federal court rulings
since Alice Corp. to highlight the consequences of the decision for software patents).
137. See Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 776 F.3d
1343, 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (ruling ineligible claims directed to a method for
using an ATM's scanner to detect the amount written on a check when a customer
makes a deposit); Utramercial Ill, 772 F.3d at 711-12 (ruling a patent invalid for
failing to claim patent-eligible subject matter under Alice Corp., despite previously
upholding the patent's validity); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1351,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (determining a patent related to guaranteeing performance of
an online transaction was invalid for failing to add an inventive concept); Planet
Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App'x 1005, 1006, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding
claims to a computer-aided method and system for managing a game of bingo
ineligible for failing to add an inventive concept); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v.
Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (ruling claims to
the generation and use of an "improved device profile" ineligible for claiming an
abstract idea (internal quotation marks omitted)).
138. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1248, 1259 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (finding eligible for patent protection a method for "generating a
composite web page that combines certain visual elements of a 'host' website with
content of a third-party merchant").
139. See supra Part L.A (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Bilski and its
effect on patent eligibility).
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than at the USPTO.'41 The most obvious effect of the Court's
decision in Alice Corp. is the decrease in the allowance of business
method patents and the unusual number of Notices of Allowance
withdrawn.'41 In practice, the Court's decision has rendered business
method claims before examiners at the USPTO presumptively
ineligible for claiming "fundamental economic practices" or
"methods of organizing human activities."142 Even though the
Court's decision in Alice Corp. did not explicitly mention "software"
once, academics and practitioners widely consider Alice Corp. as
having a similar effect on the prospects for applications directed to
software.4  At the end of the day, business methods and software
remain patentable, but after the Supreme Court's decision in Alice
Corp., successfully obtaining a patent to a business method or software
is becoming only increasingly more difficult.
B. The USPTO's Newest Guidance on § 101
On December 16, 2014, the USPTO published in the Federal
Register its proposed guidance for examiners when interpreting the
abstract idea, natural phenomena, and product of nature exceptions
140. SeeJames Bessen, What the Courts Did to Curb Patent Trolling-for Now, ATLANTIC
(Dec. 1, 2014, 12:11 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/12/
what-the-courts-did-to-curb-patent-trollingfor-now/383138/?single-page=true (noting
how the USPTO has "tightened the spigot on issuing business method patents...
issu[ing] fewer than half the number that they had issued during months prior to Alicd').
141. See Tristan Gray-Le Coz & Charles Duan, Apply It to the USPTO: Review of the
Implementation ofAlice v. CLS Bank in Patent Examination, 2014 PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 1,
2-3, 10 (2014) (reporting and analyzing a list of 830 withdrawn applications
following the guidelines released on August 4, 2014, obtained from the USPTO
pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request); Kate Gaudry, Post-Alice,
Allowances Are a Rare Sighting in Business-Method Art Units, IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 16,
2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/12/16/post-alice-allowances-rare-in-business-
method/id=52675 (showing the dramatic increase in the prevalence of § 101 rejections
in business method art units but not in others).
142. See 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg.
74,618, 74,622 (Dec. 16, 2014) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (describing
examples of the Supreme Court's recent interpretation of business methods as
abstract ideas).
143. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, The Ramifications of Alice: A Conversation with Mark
Lemley, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/09/04/the-
ramifications-of-alice-a-conversation-with-mark-lemley/id=51023 (articulating a belief
held by Stanford University Professor Mark Lemley that "Alice is a real sea change on
the patentable subject matter issue" and that "a majority of the software patents
being litigated right now.., are invalid under Alice").
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to patent eligibility.1" The guidance outlines the two-step test
announced in Alice Corp. and articulates detailed guidelines for
performing the test.1 4' After determining whether the claims are
directed to one of the judicially created exceptions, the guidelines
instruct examiners to ask whether "the claim recite[s] additional
elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception. "146 The second part of this so-called "Mayo test" is
intended "to determine whether the claim recites a patent-eligible
application of the exception. "147
The guidance then offers limitations pronounced by the Supreme
Court that may or may not amount to "significantly more" when
found in claims directed to a judicial exception.14  Considerations
that may qualify as "significantly more" include "[i]mprovements to
another technology" or "the functioning of the computer itself";
satisfying the machine-or-transformation test; "[a]dding a specific
limitation other than what is well-understood, routine and
conventional in the field, or adding unconventional steps that
confine the claim to a particular useful application"; or "[o]ther
meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological environment.'
'1 49
Limitations that would not amount to "significantly more" when
accompanying a judicial exception include simply "[a]dding the
words 'apply it' (or an equivalent)"; "[s]imply appending well-
understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to
the industry"; "[a]dding insignificant extrasolution activity"; or
"[g] enerally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment or field of use."5 The guidance also
144. 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg.
74,618 (Dec. 16, 2014) (to be codified at37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
145. See id. at 74,621-25 (providing extensive guidance on performing the two-
part test from Alice Corp., including a synthesis of cases that have dealt with "abstract
ideas," stating that "[a]bstract ideas have been identified by the courts by way of
example, including fundamental economic practices, certain methods of organizing
human activities, an idea of itself, and mathematical relationships/formulas"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
146. Id. at 74,621-22.
147. See id. at 74,622 (naming this set of inquiries "the Mayo test").
148. Id. at 74,624 (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
150. Id.
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provides sample analyses based on recent Supreme Court and
Federal Circuit decisions.15
These guidelines bear a striking resemblance to the guidelines
currently employed by the USPTO for help in determining § 103
obviousness, which has its own long and tortured history.'52 In KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,' the Supreme Court confirmed that
§ 103 rejections must be supported by "some articulated reasoning
with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness."'54 Since KSR and the release of the USPTO's extensive
guidelines, the question of obviousness has experienced dramatically
increased stability at the USPTO and in the courts.155 If examiners
follow the proposed § 101 guidance and provide clear and articulate
reasoning behind their § 101 rejections, like that required by the
§ 103 analysis, subject matter eligibility might also experience
dramatically increased stability. The lack of continuity in the analysis
makes it very difficult for examiners to assess and effectively apply a
framework that changes every handful of years. Unless Congress
chooses to intervene in the debate surrounding patents to computer-
implemented inventions, software and business method patents may
continue to face an uphill battle at the USPTO and in the courts.
However, if federal courts are willing to resist overturning the USPTO
and grant increased deference to § 101 decisions made by examiners
and the USPTO's recently modified court system, patent eligibility
and § 101 may experience the stability the doctrine so desperately needs.
CONCLUSION
Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has created a more narrow
view of what constitutes patent-eligible subject matter. Previously
151. See id. at 74,625-32 (providing sample analyses based upon Supreme Court
decisions using the guidance and summaries from additional Supreme Court and
Federal Circuit decisions, in which all of the cases discussed here are mentioned).
152. See MPEP, supra note 22, § 2141-44 (providing examination guidelines for
determining § 103 obviousness as well as guidance regarding support for obviousness
determinations under that statutory provision); see also George M. Sirilla, 35 U.S.C.
§ 103: From Hotchkiss to Hand to Rich, the Obvious Patent Law Hall-of-Famers, 32 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 437, 447 (1999) (examining nonobviousness and "its tortuous
odyssey through three centuries").
153. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
154. Id. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
155. See Teri-Lynn A. Evans, Note, The Effect of the Supreme Court's Decision in KSR on
the System of Patent Litigation, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 669, 696 (2009) (concluding that the
Court's decision in KSR provided "attorneys and judges alike [with] ... a more
uniform standard for predicting the strength of a patent").
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viewed as only a threshold test to the remainder of the patentability
analysis, the § 101 framework for claims directed to abstract ideas,
laws of nature, or physical phenomena developed by the Supreme
Court in Mayo and Alice Corp. now requires determining whether the
claim contains an "inventive step," thus adding another hurdle to the
judicial exception. This more restrictive approach to § 101 has
spelled doom for many software and business method patents in
courts and at the USPTO. The patent community can take some
solace, however, in the USPTO's most recently proposed guidance on
patent subject matter eligibility. Like the lengthy USPTO guidelines
for § 103 obviousness provided by the USPTO, implementation of the
§ 101 guidelines could lead to increased stability in determining
patent eligibility.
